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INTRODUCTION
In a practice termed "deplorable" by British Prime Minister Tony Blair,'
"revolting" by the British Home Secretary, and "disgusting" by an Arkansas
judge,3 children in the United States may be sought and offered for adoption on
the Internet. A recent high-profile fraud related to Internet-facilitated adop-
tions-the adoption by a British couple of the American "Internet twins"-has
provoked calls on both sides of the Atlantic to close this apparent loophole in
adoption regulation.4 That the absence of regulation of Internet adoption adver-
tising is widely called a loophole and a problem that needs to be fixed, suggests
that adoption generally is conceived of as an area of comprehensive legal or-
dering. If adoption is viewed as an area that is, or should be, completely regu-
lated, then the absence of regulation represents a gap or omission.
But is adoption a practice in which legal ordering is, or should be, para-
mount over private ordering? Under a private ordering model-essentially a
contract model-parties define the form and substance of their transactions
apart from any controlling, comprehensive legal regime. In a private ordering
model applied to adoption, parties to the adoption are the active agents in cre-
ating and defining their families. Birth and adoptive parents select the methods
they use to locate each other, choose with whom they will or will not deal, and
develop the terms of the adoptive agreement between themselves. The law's
t Yale Law School, J.D. 2001.
1. Erin Texeira & Marjorie Miller, Two Infants, Two Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at B 1.
2. Feds Investigate Internet Adoption, Couples Fight Over Custody of Twin Girls Sold by Web
Broker, THE DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 18, 2001, at 4.
3. Mike Collett-White, British Couple Fight for Internet Twins, REUTERS Jan. 19, 2001, available
at http://www.terra.com/technology/articulo/html/tec2326.htm.
4. E.g., Tom Brown, Twins Have Rights, Too, SCOTTISH DAILY REc., Jan. 18, 2001, at 17; Jenny
Friel, Irish Baby Scandal-Desperate Couples Paying Up To 20,000 Pounds for Babies on the Internet
Because There Simply Aren't Enough Kids Available for Adoption in Ireland, THE MIRROR, Jan. 18,
2001, at 8; Sarah Lyall, Battle by Two Couples to Adopt US. Twins Moves to Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2001, at 12A (reporting that the British government will issue guidelines on Internet use relative to
adoption in response to the Internet Twins affair); Bert Roughton, Jr., Twins Caught in Trans-Atlantic
Adoption Feud: A Deal That Began On the Internet Raises Questions About Rights, Ethics, and Legal
Jurisdiction in the E-Commerce Age, ATLANTA J. & CONST., January 17, 2001, at 12A; Texeira &
Miller, supra note 1, at B 1.
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role under this model is limited to evaluation and ratification-acts of ascer-
taining that the child will not be harmed by the arrangement and of granting le-
gal formality. Under the legal ordering model, legal institutions create the defi-
nition of adoptive families. The law's role here relative to the parties is more
expansive: determinations of who should adopt, how the adoptions take place,
and centrally of what constitutes an acceptable family, are, under the law-
centered paradigm, legal determinations. Thus, understanding adoption as pri-
marily privately-ordered or legally-ordered has significant stakes for adoption
participants and, more broadly, for the extent to which law constructs and rei-
fies normative definitions of the family.
This Note examines legal ordering versus private ordering paradigms of
adoption law and practice. The standard history of adoption presents adoption
as a pure construct of law, a "creature of statute" invented by legislatures in the
mid-nineteenth century. This history relates that legal institutions created, de-
fined, and appropriately do define the adoptive family. The implication of this
history is that such definitional power properly is within the scope of adoption
legislation, not the parties to adoptive transactions. The secondary implication
of this history is that courts must strictly construe adoption statutes on the
ground that the adoption regime, as a creature of statute, arose in derogation of
the common law. The uses of history in judicial construction have had great
practical importance in recent cases concerning adoption by same-sex couples:
courts have variously struggled to circumvent the strict construction in order to
facilitate some adoptions and have taken refuge in the shelter of strict construc-
tion as a way to deny others.
In opposition to the dominant history, this Note proposes a "counterhis-
tory' 5 of adoption. This counterhistory presents adoption practice and law as
nonstatutory, with deep private-ordering roots in contract law. An extrastatu-
tory history supports an account of adoption as a primarily privately-ordered
sphere. In addition to being more historically accurate, this account grants
autonomy to adoption participants6 to create their own families without legisla-
tive impositions of normative definitions of the family. Instead of construing an
area without regulation as a lacuna in legally-ordered regime, the counterhis-
tory requires a justification for any legislative encroachment on private ar-
rangements. Further, replacing the dominant history with one that recognizes a
pre- or nonstatutory basis for adoption law would liberate courts from the con-
straints of strict construction, enabling them to approve more nontraditional
adoptions or forcing them to openly state the nature of their opposition.
5. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1511 (1993)
(constructing a historically-based understanding of same-sex marriage as historically prevalent, not de-
viant, contrary to the dominant history).
6. The stakeholders considered to be the "adoption participants," and frequently referred to as the
"adoption triangle," are the birth parent(s), adoptive parent(s), and child or children. E.g., Audra Behn6,
Balancing the Adoption Triangle, 15 PUB. INT. 49, 53 (1996-1997).
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This Note is divided into four Parts. Part I presents the dominant legal his-
tory of adoption as an American-made "creature of statute," and speculates as
to why this history may have arisen and become entrenched. Parts II and III
present the alternative to the standard history. Part II examines the informal
practices and uses of law by adoption participants before the enactment of
adoption statutes. This Part relies on documentary evidence of American and
European adoptions predating the first adoption statutes to argue: (1) that
adoption practice flourished prior to and apart from statutes; and (2) that adop-
tion law has a robust pre- and non-statutory existence.
Part III first assesses whether the passage of adoption statutes in the mid-
1800s transformed adoption in the United States into a statutorily-bound re-
gime, and argues that because adoptions continued to be transacted outside of
the new statutory regimes, "statutorification" did not transform adoption from a
primarily privately ordered regime into a statutory regime. Part III then turns to
contemporary adoption practice to examine the current balance of legislative
versus private ordering and argues that current adoption is a mix of the pri-
vately-ordered and legislatively-defined. Currently, the adoption process is pri-
vately-ordered (e.g., parties can advertise on the Internet) but the substance of
adoptions-who may adopt, what kinds of families are permitted-is defined to
a significant extent by statutes. These statutes embody norms concerning the
religious, racial, sexual orientation, and age compositions of "standard" fami-
lies.
Part IV focuses on the harms that the dominant history perpetuates and the
work that this Note proposes the counterhistory should perform. First, it
examines discriminatory content in contemporary statutes, including legislative
preferences for racial and religious matching and the prohibition in some states
against adoption based on the sexual orientation of the prospective parent.
When courts have been called upon to apply these in cases of non-normative
adoptions (i.e., adoptions in which the child and the prospective adoptive
parents do not share race or religion, or where the prospective parents are
homosexual), courts have relied upon the history of adoption to provide
interpretive guidance. This Part examines several cases of proposed adoption
by gay or lesbian prospective parents to show how courts' reliance on the
history of adoption law as purely statutory has led those courts to do one of two
things. Either courts construe the statute strictly to defeat the proposed
adoption, or alternatively courts engage in judisprudential backflips to allow
the proposed adoption in a way consistent with a strict construction of the
statute. In the first type of case, the mishistory of adoption as purely statutory
has caused courts to deny adoptions that it otherwise would have granted, or
has provided the court with a credible, nondiscriminatory basis-the
requirement of strict construction-to reach a result contrary to the interests of
the parties. In the cases where the courts have permitted the adoptions, they
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have had to struggle through extensive, less-than-straightforward reasoning to
do so. Defeating the notion that adoption is and should be primarily legally-
ordered based upon the normative family as defined by law, in part through
challenging the idea that adoption is a creature of statute, courts should be freer
to interpret adoption statutes to permit any adoptions that serve the best
interests of the parties. Conversely, stripped of the shield of the putative
necessity of strict construction, courts disinclined to permit nonnormative
adoptions will have to state explicitly their reasons for doing so. Defeating the
mishistory of adoption as purely statutory has the potential thus to encourage
greater transparency in legal decision making and public discourse about
adoptions, and about family structures, as well as, perhaps, to faciliate a
broader range of families.
I. THE MISHISTORY OF ADOPTION:
SOURCES OF ADOPTION AS A "CREATURE OF STATUTE"
All major legal histories of adoption law and practice in the United States
perpetuate the story that affective adoption-the adoption of children for pur-
poses other than the procurement of heirs or additional labor-is an invention
of American law, created by statute in the mid-i 800s.7 Legal histories of adop-
tion generally assert that, before the inauguration of affective adoption in the
United States, the primary purpose of Western adoption was to provide adopt-
ing parents with an heir. 8 Wigmore and others note that some form of adoption
was recognized in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi of 2285 B.C.9 Adop-
tion, these histories recognize, was "regulated by law in Greece and Rome" and
"Justinian ... reduced the [adoption] system ... to a code.'0 Because of the
putative absence of any practice of adoption in the centuries between the end of
the Roman Empire and the passage of American statutes in the mid-1800s,
"modem legislation upon the subject [of adoption] has derived its chief fea-
tures" from the Roman law. ' 1 Similarly, scholars, and courts relying upon them,
7. See infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, II J.
FAM. L. 443, 447 (1971); Nancy Sparks, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Laws-Constitutional
Violation or a Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575, 577 (1982); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The
Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851,
73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042-43 (1979).
9. E.g., CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION xvii (1991); 1
ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVOLUTION OF LAW, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE
LAW 387, 426 (1915); Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV.
743, 744 (1956); Heather J. Langemak, The "Best Interests of the Child": Is a Categorical Ban on
Homosexual Adoption an Appropriate Means to This End?, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 825, 826 (2000).
10. Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 448 (1899). See also Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption,
Identity, and the Constitution, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 154 (1999); Zainaldin, supra note 8, at 1042-
43.
11. Bray, 23 tnd. App. at 448. Note that analogizing American adoption practice to Greco-Roman
practice or asserting that American adoption law derives from Roman law is inconsistent. "Adoption"
as practiced in the classical world did not center around child-rearing or even children: Greco-Roman
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assert that English common law did not recognize the practice of adoption be-
cause the concept conflicted with the principles of inheritance.' 2 Thus
"[a]doption was unknown to the common law."'
' 3
The putative absence of common law heritage has led scholars and courts to
assert that American adoption statutes are sui generis: "In matters of adoption
we have no heritage from either the common law, the ecclesiastical law, or
from the civil law, but the matter is entirely statutory."'14 Thus in the United
States adoption law is entirely "a creation of statute."' 5 "[I]n the absence of
common law precedent, American jurisdictions did not develop the concept of
adoption jurisprudentially but deferred to legislative authority."' 6 Other writers
attest to the dominance of the view of adoption as a recent, legal creation by
noting the general agreement amongst scholars on this point. As Yasuhide Ka-
washima notes in his article Adoption in Early America, "Historians and legal
scholars agree that the American law of adoption emerged in the middle of the
nineteenth century with the 1851 passage of the Massachusetts statute."' 7
adoption primarily fulfilled the purpose of wealth transfer from individuals or kin groups with no male
heirs. E.g., KRISTIN ELIZABETH GAGER, BLOOD TIES AND FICTIVE TIES: ADOPTION AND FAMILY LIFE IN
EARLY MODERN FRANCE 38 (1996). The paterfamilas would adopt an adult male from within his fam-
ily's extended kin group to remedy the absence of a male heir or occasionally to provide for a worthy
young man lacking an inheritance. Id. This practice bears almost no similarity in form or purpose to
contemporary adoption.
12. Huard, supra note 9, at 745-46. An alternative explanation for the hostility of formal law to
adoption is that adoption, in creating heirs for childless individuals, deprived the church of property that
otherwise would have escheated to it. This thesis concerning the absence of formal legal sanction for
adoption has been developed primarily by anthropologist Jack Goody who contends that, beginning in
the fourth century, the church mounted a concerted effort to increase its wealth by capturing the be-
quests of childless families. JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN
EUROPE 72, 100 (1983).
13. Bray, 23 Ind. App. at 448; Carol Al Gorenberg, Fathers' Rights vs. Children's Best Interests:
Establishing a Predictable Standard for California Adoption Disputes, 31 FAM. L.Q. 169, 175 (1997).
14. Louis Quarles, The Law of Adoption-A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 237 (1949)
(emphasis added). Note that the title of this article emphasizes the perception of adoption law as
anomalous.
15. James R. Carter, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817,
817-18 (1978). See also MORTON L. LEAVY, LAW OF ADOPTION 1 (1968); Behne, supra note 6, at 53
("Adoption did not exist at common law. It is entirely a creature of statute."); Lisa A. Fuller, Intestate
Succession Rights of Adopted Children: Should the Stepparent Exception Be Extended?, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1188, 1188 (1992); Langemak, supra note 9, at 826 n.8.
16. Carter, supra note 15, at 817-18. See also Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 448 (1899) (stating
that "[f]or the reason that it is purely statutory and in derogation of the common law, it has frequently
been said that it is to be strictly construed") (emphasis added). The recitation of adoption law history by
the Bray court and other early courts, substantiating the finding that these statutes were "in derogation
of the common law," caused courts to impose a standard of strict construction on adoption statutes that
courts did not apply to statutes with a common law history. Id. In Bray, this stricter standard led to the
adult adoptee being disinherited from the will challenged in the case. See also Keegan v. Geraghty, 101
111. 26, *5 (1881) (stating that that "[t]he adoption of children is purely a creature of the statute, no
such thing being known to the common law.") (emphasis added); In re Thompson's Adoption, 290 Pa.
586, 590 (1927) (stating that "[t]he subject of adoption has always been in the hands of the legisla-
ture").
17. Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. L. 677, 677 (1987), citing Mas-
sachusetts Adoption of Children Act of 1851, Act of May 24, 1851, 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324. See also,
Gorenberg, supra note 13, at 175; Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: Serv-
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According to the standard narrative, adoption not only did not exist at law
at this time but would have been anathema to mores of the family: prior to the
1800s, sources argue, adults recognized their children and others' children as
"chattel," valuable primarily as a source of labor.18 It was not until the nineteen
century's "invention of childhood" that adults sought relationships with chil-
dren that were principally emotional or affective instead of labor-based.' 9
Although this history has been developed and reiterated by diverse sources,
the historiology of legal adoption history is unclear; the development of the
dominant story of adoption law deserves further study. Tentatively, this Section
suggests several possible avenues through which this history developed, and
developed traction. Scholarship in other areas of law presents evidence that
early American courts resented the perceived encroachment by legislatures on a
legal system that, until the mid-1800s, had remained almost entirely common
law based.2° Confronted with the upsurge of statutes in most areas previously
controlled, if at all, by contract and common law, courts may have claimed the
statutes to be in derogation of the common law in order to arrogate to the courts
the right to strictly construe-and thus limit or defeat-them.21 This move by
courts could be seen as being directed at affecting the balance of power be-
tween courts and legislatures more than as making a statement on adoption.
Perhaps more importantly, scholars who first wrote on adoption may have
emphasized the statutory nature of adoption because, working in the legal his-
tory tradition, the nonstatutory sources of adoption law and practice (discussed
ing Whose Interests? 33 FAM. L.Q. 677, 677 (1999); Presser, supra note 8, at 465.
18. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037-41 (1992). See also, Ruthe-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption
Practice, Issues, and Laws, 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1983). See also, Catherine Ross, Families
Without Paradigms: Child Poverty and Out-of-Home Placement in Historical Perspective, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1249, 1257 (1999) (stating that "apprenticeship was the only legal form through which a family
could care for a child who was not a relative, because adoption was unknown at common law"); Goren-
berg, supra note 13, at 175; Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, in 3 THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 17 (Richard E. Behrman, ed., 1993).
19. PHILLIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 365-404
(Robert Baldick trans. 1962) (arguing for the "invention" during the eighteenth century of a concept of
childhood as a discrete and sentimentalized stage). See also, Ludmilla Jordanova, Children in History:
Concepts of Nature and Society, in CHILDREN, PARENTS AND POLITICS 3 (Geoffrey Scarre ed., 1989)
(arguing that the definition of "children," and distinction between children and adults, is socially con-
structed). But see LINDA A. POLLOCK, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS FROM 1500
TO 1900 (1983) (challenging the Aries thesis that intense parental love of children and recognition of
children as different from adults is an invention of modernity; for summary of Pollock's argument, see
especially "Summary and Conclusions," 262-271).
20. GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3-5 (1982).
21. E.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 385 (1908) (de-
crying earlier and contemporary courts' "orthodox common law attitude" towards a legislative innova-
tions "of giv[ing] to it a strict and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases which it
covers expressly."); see also, Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 12 (1936), reprinted in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 131-33 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1937)
(describing same, stating that courts treated new statutes in the late eighteen and early 1900s as "to be
obeyed grudgingly, by construing them narrowly and treating them as though they did not exist for any
purposes other than those embraced within the strict construction of their words").
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infra) were not visible or available to them. Far be it from this Note to survey
legal historical and analytic methodologies.22 However, despite the extraordi-
nary complexity of attempting to analyze competing legal analytical method-
ologies accurately, it is not inaccurate to state legal history methodologies up
through the middle of the twentieth century primarily emphasized intra-legal,
textual sources to the exclusion of social and empirical sources. As legal histo-
rian Robert W. Gordon notes, legal scholarship long held as "dogma that legal
forms can be understood apart from their social context. ' 23 The influence of so-
cial history and the development of the "law and society" school of legal analy-
sis have, in the later part of the twentieth century, significantly broadened the
24types of sources upon which legal scholars draw. The willingness to look at
families and children as matters fit for serious academic attention, and social
history methods that permit such investigation, are of more recent vintage than
25the early legal commentaries on adoption. The perpetuation of this history by
more recent legal scholars may be explained by narrative momentum. Contem-
porary scholars (e.g., Kawashima, discussed infra) seem often merely to recite
without examination the generally accepted "truth" that adoption did not exist
prior to its statutory "creation"--perhaps for the very good reason that it is a
generally accepted truth.
The most compelling justification for the standard history, though, seems to
be its rhetorical correspondence with the great themes in the American identity
22. Modes of legal history and analysis have produced an entire field of legal historiography. Im-
portant works analyzing legal history and historiography include ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL
MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978) (particularly emphasizing the influence of sociology in more recent legal
history's inclusion of extra-legal sources); Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Problems and Possibilities of
American Legal History, in THE STATE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (H. Bass ed. 1970); Wythe Holt,
Morton Horowitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663
(1982); David Sugarman, Theory and Practice in Law and History: A Prologue to the Study of the Re-
lationship Between Law and Economy From a Socio-Historical Perspective, in LAW, STATE, AND
SOCIETY 70-106 (B. Fryer, A. Hunt, D. McBamet, & B. Moorhouse eds. 1981); Mark V.Tushnet, A
Marxist Analysis ofAmerican Law, 1 MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978).
23. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 68 (1984). The centrality of
legal texts to legal history prior to the mid-twentieth century was a central subject of critique for the
next generation of legal scholars, including Morton Horowitz, whose work throughout the 1970s radi-
cally critiqued traditional legal histories for their emphasis on legal institutions and texts over social and
economic realities. E.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); The
Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 276,
281, 283 (1973).
24. Gordon, supra note 23, at 70, arguing that "Law-and-Society studies are beginning to make a
dent on the mainstream lawyers who, until recently, showed little more than scorn for Realist empiri-
cism." That US legal scholarship methodologies historically focused on legal texts independent of social
context is particularly curious. As Gordon notes, "How ironic it is that the country whose... political
origins lie in revolutionary protests organized by 'the people out of doors,' crowds explicitly claiming
legal status and legitimacy; and whose history is so full of mass reform movements should have pro-
duced such a Tory legal literature, narrowly focused on official agencies.., and almost completely in-
different to extra-institutional law-making." Id. at n.34.
25. Aries's work is credited with establishing the family as a subject of serious study. Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1138 ("Before Philippe Aris'
Centuries of Childhood, it is generally admitted, family history barely existed as a serious enterprise. In
the... years since that work appeared,.., the body of work in this area has grown immensely.").
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and the American dream. According to the standard history, America, a land of
self-invention and self-made men, naturally embraced self-made families in a
way no other people had before; a land of opportunity for strangers, American
families gave opportunity to stranger's children. And, as a people who express
themselves through democratic law-making, Americans enshrined this spirit in
laws made by bodies of ordinary citizens, the legislatures. The passage below,
from a recent book on adoption in America, expresses the full myth power of
the adoption-as-American-invention idea:
From the days of the "orphan trains" [between 1854 and 1929], adoption has been
said to embody a distinctly American ideal. In England, adoption was not permitted
by statute until this century, because social status and, thus, identity were seen as
being determined by bloodline alone. The United States was a nation of immigrants
who adjusted to new surroundings, made fresh starts, and shaped their own desti-
nies, like children who were adopted. 
26
This story of American adoption illustrates every element of the dominant
history of adoption challenged by this paper. First, it states that adoption of this
type arose de novo in America in the mid-1800s. Second, it links adoption to
statutory law: it takes as the starting point for American adoption the time at
which state legislatures passed the first adoption statutes and identifies the ad-
vent of adoption in Europe by looking at dates of statutory passage. Third, it
identifies adoption as a uniquely American practice: Europe, obsessed with
lineage, could not have developed adoption, particularly stranger adoption,
while America embraced this way of forming families because all Americans
are, in a sense, "adopted children."
Perhaps most importantly, the story of American adoption relies upon
adoption as a specifically statutory invention in order to buttress the claim for
its Americanness. This passage shows that Americans can only claim adoption
as uniquely our own if we emphasize dates of statutory passage as marking the
inception of the practice because America passed its statutes before the retro-
grade Old World. By contrast, if adoption's practice is not identical with statu-
tory passage but is instead a social practice accomplished through various legal
forms, or without legal formality, then the Old World may have engaged in it as
well. The claim for American invention of this form fails without the insistence
on the statutory because the notion that Europeans practiced "American"-style
adoption would undermine the American sensibility that this country was the
first in the world to value people apart from birth status. In this way, the claim
of statuoriness and of Americanness unite: this unity specifically supports the
proud American strain of meritocracy and opportunity through distinguishing it
from rejected European social mores.
Undoubtedly, the myth of American adoption has powerful rhetorical reso-
nance; it captures essential features of the American self-image. But whatever
26. LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 33 (1990) (emphasis added).
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its power, the myth also obscures. It communicates a view of national identity,
but places the power of identity creation in the hands of legislatures-under the
adoption-is-purely-statutory view, legislatures establish the identity of the
American family. This Note argues that the nonstatutory history of adoption, in
addition to being more historically accurate, recognizes the creative roles
played by adoption participants. Records demonstrate that individuals who
sought to adopt or to place a child for adoption did so in colonial and early
America and contemporaneously in Europe. These stakeholders demonstrated
creativity in their use of contract law and, to a lesser extent, judge-made com-
mon law, to accomplish adoptions in the absence of statutes or Code27 provi-
sions "permitting" adoption. While the standard histories lead with the law and
impute to law the creative role of originating adoption, these sources support
the argument, infra, that formal law has played the follower's role, both tempo-
rally and substantively. Placed in this context, private adoption arrangements
between individuals-whether forged in a geographic community or a commu-
nity of interest on the Intemet-appear continuous with the long tradition of
adoption, not as loopholes in a statutory regime.
II. PRE-STATUTORY ADOPTION:
EARLY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
Documentary evidence from France and England, primarily notarial con-
tracts and public records from French and English public institutions, demon-
strates that adoption and stranger adoption existed in Europe from at least the
Medieval period forward. Records of such adoptions are particularly abundant
28from French sources spanning the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Following
European tradition, or perhaps a desire for children that goes beyond the cul-
turally-specific, affective adoption occurred from the earliest days in colonial
America and the early United States. These American adoptions, like their
European precursors, were effected primarily through contract or testamentary
instruments; later, post-colonial adoptions occasionally received judicial or
legislative ratification. These European and American sources show that pre-
statutory adoptions were primarily private orderings; the role of law in these
arrangements was limited to formalizing the private arrangements to the extent
desired by the participants.
27. "Code" here refers generally to the formal laws of non-common law countries, e.g., the Code
Civil in France.
28. Due to its early development of bureaucratic culture and highly-developed legal system, French
records are most numerous. There is sparse documentary evidence of formalized adoptions during or
prior to the Renaissance; it is unclear if the scarcity of documents reflects the infrequency of record-
keeping or whether adoptions occurred infrequently.
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A. French and English Practice of "American" Adoption, 1600s-1800s:
Legal Shaping Through Contract by Adoption Stakeholders
French history of adoption, shaped largely by the work of Jean Pierre Gut-
ton, notes that while adoption disappeared from the written law after Roman
times, adoption practice flourished as a social reality throughout the medieval
period and Enlightenment. 29 Social historian Elizabeth Gager's extensive re-
search into French public records archives has revealed notarial records and re-
cords of public institutions that cared for abandoned children; these records
provide extensive evidence of adoption distinct from the "binding out" of most
children for service. 30 Two types of adoption occurred in early modem France.
The first was the adoption of a child from its natural parent(s) by a family
within the community. 3' The second type was the adoption of an abandoned
infant stranger by unrelated adults-true "American-type" adoption.32 These
adoptions were distinct from the well-noted, historically-recognized practice of
adopting an adult heir to ensure property transmission. Furthermore, they oc-
curred primarily through private ordering outside the French Code Civil.
French public institutions tasked with caring for abandoned children, such
as the Couche des Pauvres Enfans Trouvez in Lyon 33 and the Parisian found-
29. As the Associations de Parents par Pays d'Origine, a French non-governmental organization
for the promotion of international adoption, notes:
Connue et largement rkpandue i Athnes et 6 Rome, cettefiliation disparait du droit, et donc
des crits, avec la periode barbare, aux environs des annees 800, pour ne resurgir que lors
de la revolution. [Jean-Pierre Gutton] a cependant montri, en tudiant 6i lafois les archives
notariales et celles des hdpitaux, que la pratique n 'a en fait jamais cess9 pendant le moyen
dge et l 'ancien regime. La pratique de l 'abandon d'enfant, remis 6 une tierce personne ou i
un hdpital, est une rdalit6 sociale de 1 'ancien rcgime. Pour assurer l 'entretien des enfants
recueillis, les institutions hospitali&res sont amen~es 6 les confier 6i des particuliers, et ainsi,
sans le dire, d6 renouer avec I 'adoption 6 la romaine. D 'autre part, de nombreuses donations
d'enfants s 'effectuent entre particuliers et sont scell~es par un contrat notarial irrevocable.
Ii n 'y avait pas de rglementation nationale en la matiere.
Text available at http://members.aol.com/apaec/apaec/bre.htm, last updated Oct. 14, 2001, citing and
summarizing the work of Jean-Pierre Gutton. See generally JEAN-PIERRE GuTrON, HISTOIRE DE
L'ADOPTION EN FRANCE (1993). This text may be translated as follows:
"Known and well-practiced from Athens to Rome, this form of filiation disappeared from the
written law during the Dark Ages, around the year 800, not to return until the Revolution.
Gutton has shown, however, in studying notarial archives and records of the civil bureaucratic
institutions [hopiteaux], that the practice of adoption never abated during the Middle Ages.
The practice of abandoning infants into the care of third party or a hospital was a social reality
of the ancien r~gime. To provide for the maintenance of "found children," the hospitals, with-
out so stating, renewed the practice of adoption. At the same time, large numbers of children
were "donated" between parties known to each other in transactions accomplished through ir-
revocable notarial contract. [Yet], no national laws on adoption existed at the time."
(Author's translation.)
30. GAGER, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that "the desire for children among childless families, in
combination with the growing numbers of destitute children.. . served to sustain adoption practices [in
France] well into the eighteenth century").
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id.
33. "Couche des Pauvres Enfans Trouvez" translates as "cradle of poor foundling children." (Mid-
dle-French spelling of"enfants" (children) omits the "t" found in modem French spelling.)
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ling hospice L 'H6tel-Dieu, contain in their registers evidence of adoption of
these children. 34 Further evidence of adoptions from the Couche surfaces in the
registers of different notaries who worked with that institution during the pe-
riod from 1570 to 1677.
35
While early American formal law was silent on adoption, French formal
law actively discouraged it:36 as a French legal commentator of the 1700s
noted, "We do not recognize in this kingdom any other form of filiation, kin-
ship, or civil alliance than that which derives from blood and Nature."37
Yet, legal discouragement did not prevent adoptions from occurring or from
attaining legal formality through contracts created and ratified by the adoption
participants. The presence of the Parisian and Lyonnais notarial records for-
malizing the adoptions demonstrates that the parties involved did want to ac-
complish the adoptions pursuant to contract and to formalize the transfer.
38
These contracts record the names, residences, and professions of the adoptive
parents and the name, sex, and age of the child; often they also detail how the
child came to be placed for adoption.39 These documents also specified a con-
tract of care between the adoptive parent(s) and the adoptee.40 A typical con-
tract specified that the adoptive parents would provide a home, education, and
apprenticeship (for a male child) or dowry (for a female child), and inheri-
41tance. Some of these terms would have appeared in binding out contracts. The
last several terms, however, distinguish these contracts from service contracts.
Through agreeing to provide a dowry for a girl and inheritance rights for a boy
or girl, the contracts signal that the adults intended to include the children as
full family members. Because the Justinian Code recognized the inheritance
rights of natural children only, granting the inheritance right signified family
membership and set the adopted child equal to a natural child. The contracts
also often specified that the adoptive parents would give the child "parental...
affection;" reciprocally, the adoptee agreed "to obey and honor" the adoptive
parents. 42 The promise of parental affection demonstrates the intimate, non-
economic nature of the adoptions; that the child's contractual promise echoes
the commandment to honor one's mother and father confirms that these adop-
tions established relationships perceived by the parties-and perhaps the cul-
34. "H6tel-Dieu" translates as "house of God."
35. GAGER, supra note 11, at 10.
36. CLAUDE SERRES, LES INSTITUTIONS DU DROIT FRANCOIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DE CELLES DE
JUSTINIEN (Paris, 1753), cited in GAGER, supra note 11, at 37.
37. SERRES, supra note 36 (emphasis added).
38. See generally GAGER, supra note 11, at 10 (relating specific histories of adoption and their
ancillary records); see also JEAN PAUL POISSON, NOTARIES ET SOCIETE: TRAVAUX D'HISTOIRE ET DE
SOCIOLOGIE NOTARIALES (1990).
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ture-as fully familial. Thus, these notarized contracts demonstrate profound
similarities between adoption practices in sixteenth through eighteenth-century
France and adoption practices in America from the seventeenth century through
the present.
Adoption in England, only occasionally performed, followed a different
course than in France both in practice and at law. English law, like French law,
officially disfavored practices that could impugn bloodline as the basis for the
descent of property. It appears that the legal and metaphysical gravity imputed
to blood in England, however, caused adoption both to occur less frequently
than in France and to gain less open legal recognition. At the same time, Eng-
land's less developed bureaucratic culture during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries produced and left behind fewer records than French culture of
the time. England possessed no public institution equivalent to the Couche des
Pauvres Enfans, nor did any other similar public institution make and keep rec-
ords of the disposition of children.
It is generally held that English law did not admit heirship that was not tied
to blood lineage and that adoption was therefore unknown at English law. As
Glanvill, an English legal authority of the eighteenth century, pronounced,
"Only God can make a heres, not man." 43 Despite this categorical pronounce-
ment against non-blood filiation, nineteenth-century English legal commenta-
tors acknowledged that some plurality existed in English law and practice
around the permissibility of adoption. Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic Mait-
land remarked in their monumental work The History of English Law that "far
back in remote centuries Englishmen had seen no difficulty in giving the name
heres to a person chosen by a land-holder to succeed him in his holding...."
Pollock and Maitland further note that English law leaned toward a kind of
recognition of adoption through the mechanism of legitimating children that
clearly were not the offspring, or the legitimate offspring, of the parents who
claimed them.44 As Bracton wrote, "[S]purious offspring.., are legitimated
sometimes, as it were by adoption .... [I]f the husband has taken the child into
his house and.., nourished it as his son.., such a child will be adjudged to be
the heir and to be legitimate.
' 45
This brief passage conveys several important points about English adoption
practice and English law's approach thereto. First, that a passage on adoption
appears in the major treatise on English law indicates adoption occurred often
enough to merit Bracton's commentary. Second, Bracton differentiates between
arrangements under which a child is taken in and raised as the child of the fam-
43. Glanvill, vii, 1., quoted in 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 111 ff. (2d ed. 1898).
44. Id. at 398-99, citing I BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE f.63b, 503 (Twiss ed. 1878).
45. 1 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE f.63b, 503 (Twiss ed. 1878), quoted in Huard, supra note 9,
at 746 (emphasis removed).
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ily versus not as child of the family; this suggests that both types of practices
were known and distinguished. Third, Bracton records that a child "nour-
ished.., as [a] son" by the head of household would be "adjudged" by courts
as the legal equivalent of a natural child. This indicates a willingness on the
part of courts to recognize at law adoption-like situations where a child was
raised as if it were the natural child of the family.
A more common method of providing for parentless children in England
was that of binding out or putting out of the children for service. 46 This institu-
tion, however, did not exist specifically to accommodate orphans, as children of
all classes were bound out for service in England.47 As Phillippe Ari~s noted in
Centuries of Childhood, up through the early nineteenth century "a large part of
the population ... was still living... with the children separated from their
parents."
48
The practice of binding out children and the legal provision for needy chil-
dren united in the English doctrine of parens patriae, the principle that king is
father of all of the people.49 Henry VIII, never successfully a natural father but
parenspatriae to thousands, passed the first act ordering all vagrant children to
be seized by the Crown and bound out.50 This pragmatic remedy to the problem
of needy children survived in early America, at times providing an alternative
to adoption and at times overlapping with it.
B. The Colonies: Binding Out for Service, Taking In for Care, and the
Importance of a Parent's Will
The earliest records of colonial America present a picture of domestic rela-
tions continuous with contemporary Europe: As in England and France, chil-
dren in the Colonies were bound out for service as apprentices.5 1 Also continu-
ous with English law and practice, colonial leaders implemented the parens
patriae concept to bind out children by agency of law. These acts were initi-
ated by law, as distinguished from privately-ordered adoptions. The actors, in
their official capacities, made a determination about the fitness of a child's ex-
46. Presser, supra note 8, at 453.
47. Id. See also Grant McCracken, The Exchange of Children in Tudor England: An Anthropo-
logical Phenomenon in Historical Context, 8 J. FAM. HIST. 303, 307 (1983).
48. ARIs, supra note 19, at 404.
49. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (."Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the
country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability
such as juveniles or the insane .... Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the
King had a royal prerogative to act as a guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants.").
50. 0. JOCELYN DUNLOP & RICHARD D. DENMAN, ENGLISH APPRENTICESHIP AND CHILD LABOUR:
A HISTORY 70 (1912).
51. ROBERT FRANCIS SEYBOLT, APPRENTICESHIP AND APPRENTICESHIP EDUCATION IN COLONIAL
NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 36 (1917).
52. GERALDINE YOUCHA, MINDING THE CHILDREN: CHILD CARE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 18 (1995).
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isting situation and the superiority of an alternative one; the child and families
concerned then complied. Adoption in the colonies existed distinct from bind-
ing out and demonstrated the inverse relationship between the participants and
legal ordering-insofar as the parties resorted to it at all, law merely formalized
adoptions arranged privately.
Generally, historians note the strictness of colonial parens patriae power
over children.53 But acts under the parens patriae power provided for orphans,
illegitimates, the abandoned or impoverished, and the neglected or abused.54
Minutes from a Salem town meeting in 1648 record how a town disposed of
children needing care: Elders agreed that the "children of Reuben Guppy [are]
to be placed out, the boy till the age of 21 years and the maid till the age of 18
years. ' 55
While it is not recorded why the children were removed, it is clear that such
a placing represented a normative or community judgment about the suitability
of the situation for the children; law here expressed and imposed the judg-
ment. 56 By contrast, in cases where parties effected an adoption instead of a
foster-type placement, the adoption represented the parties' deliberate departure
from the default of binding out. Adoption and binding out also exhibit different
directional relationships between the participants and the law. In binding out,
legal notions of child welfare, effectuated through the parens patriae power,
determined the placements. In colonial adoptions, consistent with European
adoption practices, individuals structured their own arrangements and utilized
law secondarily.
57
1. Colonial Wills as Evidence of "True " Adoption: Placement By Will
and Affirmation of Affect Through Heirship
While scant work has been done on adoption during the colonial period, the
work that has been done reveals that adoption, fully consistent with the modem
definitions thereof, occurred during the colonial period.58 In the earliest colo-
53. E.g., FLOYD MARTINSON, FAMILY IN SOCIETY 22 (1970) (dwelling on the harshness of the Pu-
ritan regime towards children). A Massachusetts act of 1646, for example, provided for the punishment
of insubordinate children by death. Colonial Laws Regarding Children, in AMERICAN FAMILIES 291
(Elizabeth Douvan et al. eds., 1980) (excerpting colonial laws).
54. YOUCHA, supra note 52, at 18.
55. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION
6(1998).
56. It is also clear that such a placement did not constitute an adoption: The time limit ("till the age
of 18 years") establishes a temporary care relationship akin to fosterage instead of a family-like bond
that endures in perpetuity.
57. See discussion infra Part II.
58. Kawashima, supra note 17, at 677. Although Kawashima's paper uncovers the documentary
history of adoption in colonial wills and contracts, he also asserts that adoption law is purely statutory.
While wills and deeds are legal documents-there is no contention that these instruments were illegal or
legally defective-Kawashima does not consider them as part of the legal history of adoption. Rather,
he considers adoption law narrowly as statutory law developed specifically around adoption. This leads
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nial times, these adoptions occurred both informally and through written in-
struments-primarily wills, deeds, and other testamentary bequests that trans-
ferred a child subject to adoption. 59 These colonial wills specified the disposi-
tion of the child, even going so far as to name contingent alternative devisees
for the child should the first devisee be unable to take the child or later become
incapacitated. 60 This care in ensuring the placement of the child in a family that
would agree to raise it as their own demonstrates the importance to these indi-
viduals that their children be raised as family members, not as apprentices.
Participants in these placements at times referred to the transaction as an
"adoption." More frequently, the document does not use term adoption; yet, all
the indicia of "modem" adoption were present, rendering these transfers adop-
tions-in-fact, if not in name. An early record from Plymouth Colony demon-
strates the adoption-like nature of these placements of children pursuant to the
death of their parent(s). The record states that "Lawrence Lichfeild lying on his
Death bedd sent for John Allin and Ann his wife and Desired to give and be-
queath unto them his youngest son Josias Lichfeild if they would.., take him
as theire child.' 1 When the Allins inquired for how long Lichfeild wanted
them to keep Josias, Lichfeild replied "for ever., 62 It is significant that Lich-
feild specified "for ever," which implies the permanency of a family bond;
when children were "bound out" out for apprenticeship, the child would be
kept only until majority. "For ever," "as theire child," and the "if' contingency,
mark this transfer as distinct from "binding out."
Wills provide another type of evidence for adoption during the colonial pe-
riod. The bequests to children in the wills of those who had received a child to
raise demonstrate the strength and nature of the bond between the adult and
child. Thus, colonial evidence of adoption is bounded by wills: The wills or
dying requests of birth parents usually initiated the adoptive transfer and the
wills of the adults receiving the child demonstrate the affective, adoption-in-
fact nature of the relationship formed through the transfer.
Supporting the contention that these placements constituted adoptions-in-
fact whether the term "adoption" was employed or not is the extent to which
the receiving adult(s) included the unrelated child in a will. 63 The 1686 will of
to a tautology: if adoption law is what is initiated by statute, then there can be no pre-statutory adoption
law. The only other detailed empirical research into adoption records of the colonial period has been
done by the sociologist John Demos, in his work on early American family life. JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE
COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY (1970).
59. Kawashima, supra note 17, at 683 ("Parents ordinarily provided for the disposition of the [mi-
nor] child in their wills .....
60. Id. at 684.
61. DEMOS, supra note 58, at 89 (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Kawashima, supra note 17, at 685 (asserting that "their [the unrelated adults'] attachment to
and feelings toward the children (especially orphans) living with them can be seen in their wills ....")
(citing WILLS AND ADMINISTRATIONS, NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1750-1770, at 52
(1964)). Note, however, that Kawashima does not view these records, or the contents thereof, as evi-
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Henry Bemett, who raised two girls unrelated to him from their infancy,64 be-
queathed to the girls his entire estate and referred to them in his will by his own
surname.65 The bequest of property alone could signal family-like attachment;
the reference to the girls by his own surname shows that Bemett raised the girls
as his daughters. Similarly, in 1769, Georgia resident William Russell provided
in his will that a "dowry of 300 pounds sterling" should be provided "to Anna
Hunter, Dr. Joseph Hunter's daughter," whom Russell had raised.66
These placements share hallmarks of what is now termed "adoption." In
these situations, the child was reared by parties other than the biological parents
and frequently by adults that were not part of the child's family or extended
family.67 The placement of a child generally came about due to orphanage or
the inability of the biological parents to provide for the child, but the subse-
quent arrangement was not merely for child welfare-which might have pro-
ceeded as a state act under the parens patriae power-but for the purpose of
creating family-like relationships. The familial purpose was reinforced by the
fact that adoptors often were childless adults who sought to obtain or "replace"
a child.68 The presence in these transactions of every defining characteristic of
the "modem" American-type adoption, except for the formality of a court pro-
ceeding pursuant to statute, argues that adoption did in fact exist in its modem
form prior to statutory enactment and even prior to the birth of the United
States.
dence of pre-statutory adoption. Immersed in the legal centrist approach to adoption history, he writes
that, "[h]istorians and legal scholars agree that the American law of adoption emerged in the middle of
the nineteenth century with the 1851 passage of the Massachusetts statute, 'An Act to Provide for the
Adoption of Children."' Id. at 677.
64. Prior to the Victorian era and its cult of true womanhood, it was common for men to receive
custody of and rear children; the assumption that women are more fit to rear children is of recent vin-
tage. Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment
in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1130-31 (1999). For a general discussion
of the association of the Cult of True Womanhood with child rearing, see John Demos, The American
Family in Past Times, in AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 53, at 74, 80-83. ("Rooted at the center of the
Home stood the highly sentimentalized figure of Woman. It was she who represented and maintained
the tender virtues .... The careful rearing of children was the most important activity of the True
Woman.").
65. 2 MARYLAND CALENDAR OF WILLS, 1685-1702, at 6 (1968), cited in Kawashima, supra note
17, at 692.
66. ABSTRACTS OF COLONIAL WILLS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1733-1777, at 121 (1962), cited
in Kawashima, supra note 17, at 683.
67. Many of these transfers pursuant to will devised the child to a relative. Id. However, Kawa-
shima, in his work on colonial wills, found that assignment of the child to an unrelated party for that
party to rear as his or her own child was "common." Kawashima, supra note 17, at 683 (citing
ABSTRACTS OF COLONIAL WILLS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1733-1777, at 121 (1962)). It is unlikely
that true "stranger" adoption could have occurred in the early colonies; while adoption may have existed
in these small settlements, strangers probably did not.
68. For example, note the 1720s case of Robert Stevens and his wife, who, after the death of their
only son, took in an infant boy to iaise, ABSTRACTS OF THE WILLS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1670-1740, at 63, 105 (1960), cited in Kawashima, supra note 17, at 690; and the case of May Bickley
and his wife, childless New Yorkers who, in the early 1700s, each "adopted" a child to raise, 2
ABSTRACTS OF WILLS ON FILE IN THE SURROGATE'S OFFICE, CITY OF NEW YORK, 1708-1728, at 272-73
(1894), cited in Kawashima, supra note 17, at 690-91.
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Not only do the Bernett and Russell-Hunter adoptions demonstrate that
adoptions transpired extra-statutorily at this time, they also hold a moral for
contemporary adoption debates about what constitutes an appropriate adoptive
family. Bemett and Russell appear from the records to be childless men who
adopted daughters. Bernett received the girls as infants; it is not clear at what
age Anna Hunter was adopted by Russell. Under a regime that defines re-
quirements for adoptive parents through building normative judgments into the
law about appropriate families, such arrangements might not pass muster: par-
ties like these might be precluded from adopting because of suspicion about
their sexual preferences, 69 or because they would provide a single-parent
home.7 °
2. Adoption Practice in Post-Colonial America: Contract, Private
Legislative Enactments, and Court Orders
By the late 1700s, legal formalities attesting to the existence of adoption
had expanded from wills and bequests to include private legislative enactments,
court orders granting a change of name of the adopted child, and various forms
of contract. 71 Adoptions began to be performed by private agreement, similar to
a conveyance of real estate, that was authenticated by making a public record.72
Through this period, wills also continued to provide evidence of adoption.
73
The term "adoption" also began to occur throughout these documents with
greater frequency. These legal forms simultaneously demonstrate both that
adoption and adoption law preexisted the statutory laws of the mid-1800s.
Further, they evidence a model in which law works to ratify private arrange-
ments instead of the contemporary conception that views any unregulated area
of adoption practice as a problematic "loophole."
Legislative records of name changes in Maryland reveal the linkage be-
tween name-changes and adoptions.74 These private enactments fulfilled two
69. In the case of a single male seeking to adopt a female child there is a sexual-orientation Catch-
22, as both heterosexual and homosexual orientations could be suspect.
70. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (noting the rejection of single adults as prospective
adoptive parents).
71. As E. Wayne Carp notes, "[m]any private bills providing for the adoption of children by adults
were enacted by state legislatures. Parents who sought a change of name for their adopted children had
recourse to these private legislative enactments .... CARP, supra note 55, at 7.
72. Howe, supra note 18, at 175. Howe notes this as a historical curiosity but considers adoption
law proper to be purely statutory. Id. She construes deed-based adoptions to represent a "chattel" con-
cept of children. Id. at 177. Thus, she does not consider deed-based adoptions as part of the same phe-
nomenon as contemporary, affective adoptions.
73. For example, note the 1798 will of New Yorker Robert Stein, which grants his "adopted
daughter," along with his biological children, a share of his estate. CALENDAR OF WILLS ON FILE AND
RECORDED IN THE OFFICES OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, OF THE COUNTY CLERK AT
ALBANY, AND OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 1626-1836, at 371-72 (Berthold Fernow ed., 1896).
74. E.g., 1847 Md. Laws 29 (changing the name of Catharine Maker to Catharine Coudy and
authorizing James and Mahala Coudy "to adopt the said Catharine Maker as their daughter and legal
heir at law.") (emphasis added); 1820 Md. Laws 155 (General Assembly granted petition of George
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purposes. Primarily, they served to effect a name change. Subsidiarily, they
specified that the name change was sought for a child that the party sought to
adopt or had adopted. For example, a Pennsylvania bill entitled "An Act to
Change the Names of Certain Persons Therein Named" provided, in part, "Be it
enacted.., that Eliza Jane Jarvis... the adopted child of James and Hannah
Miles, shall henceforth be called and known by the name of Eliza Jane
Miles... ,75 In another case, an 1824 Maryland bill granted the petition of
George Jacob to change the name of Louisa Decoutres to Louisa Jacob. The
bill noted, in a "whereas" clause, that Jacob "wishes to adopt the said Louisa as
his daughter., 76 These bills' open recognition of the adoptions additionally sig-
nals that Maryland lawmakers viewed adoption as legal. That the primary pur-
pose of these bills was to effect the name change and not the adoption itself in-
dicates that the legislature viewed adoptions as ordinary, lawful occurrences
that parties could transact between themselves by contract or other agreement.
After 1868, Maryland transferred the authority to grant name changes pur-
suant to adoptions from the legislature to the state circuit courts, perhaps be-
cause courts accommodate large numbers of cases more easily than a legisla-
ture.77 In Massachusetts, between 1781 and 1851, the General Court granted
one hundred and one such orders. 78 A commentary from this time period on
adoption suggests that these statistics, culled recently from old and incomplete
records, may significantly understate the number of adoptions that actually took
place. David Dudley Field, drafter of New York's Field Code and advocate of
adoption law reform, remarked that "thousands of children" were "adopted
every year" in New York state.79 Field's observation that "thousands" of adop-
tions occurred annually in a single state indicates that the frequency of adoption
may be significantly underreported in surviving court records. Because judicial
or legislative ratification was not necessary for an adoption to be completed, it
is possible that these remaining records pertain to the exceptional situations and
illustrate the "tip of the iceberg" of the phenomenon of pre-statutory adoption.
Townes to change his name to George Thompson "to enable him to become the adopted child and heir
at law of Thomas Thompson.") (emphasis added), cited in Carol County Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Edel-
mann, 577 A.2d 14, 26 n.8 (1990).
75. 1844 Pa. Laws 212, cited in Presser, supra note 8, at 463, n. 102 (second emphasis added).
76. 1824 Md. Laws, ch. 150 (emphasis added), cited in Carol County, 577 A.3d at 26 n.8.
77. Carrol County, 577 A.2d. at 26 n.8.
78. CARP, supra note 55, at 7. The number of adoptions may have significantly exceeded the num-
ber of legal name changes, which were primarily of importance for, e.g., inheritance and land convey-
ance.
79. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD ET AL., CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK/REPORTED COMPLETE
BY THE COMMISIONERS OF THE CODE 36 (1865), quoted in HELEN L. WITMER & ELIZABETH HERZOG,
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 24 (1963) (emphasis added). In 1865, the commissioners of the proposed
Civil Code for New York (David Dudley Field and his colleagues) wrote: "The total absence of any
provision for the adoption of children is one of the most remarkable defects of our law. Thousands of
children are actually, though not legally, adopted every year; yet there is no method by which the
adopting parents can secure the children to themselves except by a fictitious apprenticeship, a form
which, when applied to children in the cradle, becomes absurd and repulsive." 1d.
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In all of the states mentioned, private bills and court orders only formalized
name changes of adopted children; they did not formalize the adoptions them-
selves, which proceeded either without any legal formality or by contract. The
private bills and court orders of this period demonstrate the gradual develop-
ment of the law of adoption around the ongoing practice of adoption. The tem-
poral relationship between these adoptions and the legal proceedings is note-
worthy-that the legal proceedings occurred after the adoptions literally
demonstrates the responsive role of formal law relative to the actions of the
adoption stakeholders.8 °
III. CONSOLIDATION AND CONTINUITY:
CONTEXTUALIZING THE RISE AND IMPACT OF ADOPTION STATUTES
A. Origins and Scope of the First Statutes: Reducing the Burden on Courts
and Legislatures
That adoption statutes arose in the mid-1800s has already been noted.8 1
Statutes arose at this time within the context of the growing number of adop-
tions formalized at law throughout the late seventeen and early 1800s, and the
development of statutes more generally as a feature of American law. During
the mid-1800s, American law underwent a large-scale movement to simplify
the common law through the passage of general statutes and the creation of re-
statements. 82 Areas of law previously adjudicated through individual legislative
and judicial acts became subject to new statutes. For example, prior to the
1850s, private judicial or legislative acts were necessary not only for adoptions
but for the granting of divorces and charters of incorporation; the mid-1800s
saw the creation of the first general enabling statutes governing all these areas
of ongoing practice.83 Rather than being seen to inaugurate American adoption,
or even American adoption law, the early statutes should be understood in the
80. Further, that courts and legislatures granted these acts in respect of pre-concluded adoptions
demonstrates that, at this time, adoption was legal and practiced in the absence of statutes.
81. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
82. This historical moment of transition from a primarily common law system to a significantly
statutory system has long been recognized. See, e.g., CALABRESi, supra note 20, at 83-85; James
McCanley Landis, Statutes and Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); Robert Ran-
toul, Oration at Scituate, in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 317-19 (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996). Non-statutory collections of the common law, such as the Restatements,
also originated during this time period. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 20, at 85.
83. Massachusetts passed its divorce enabling statute the same year as the adoption statute, 1851.
Divorces were granted by individual legislative act prior to the enactment of the statute. 1851 Mass.
Acts ch. 82 § 2. For a discussion of the trend toward codification, see generally Gunther A. Weiss, The
Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (1999) (discussing
the history of codification and emphasizing the development of the Field Code); Glen Weissenberger,
Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence as a Codification of the Common
Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1567-74 (1999) (giving a general overview of the move towards
statutes, with examples of the transformation of areas previously governed by common law).
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context of the codification of non-statutory legal practices.
Beginning with Mississippi in 1846 and Texas in 1850, state legislatures
began to enact general adoption bills to replace the practice of granting par-
ticular bills.84 These first adoption statutes arose at least in part out of the need
to reduce the burden placed on courts by numerous petitioners seeking legal
formalization of their adoptions and clarification of inheritance rights.8 As
Calabresi has noted, "[T]he nature of nineteenth-century codes [is that] they
were on the whole collections of the common law.... They represented solu-
tions to problems that had been dealt with by the courts for centuries."
86
The 1851 Massachusetts statute, 87 which provided a model for statutes sub-
sequently enacted in other states,8 8 differed from the Mississippi and Texas
statutes in its establishment of the requirement of judicial oversight. 89 The Mas-
sachusetts law required approval of the adoption based upon findings made by
the court.90 It did not, as distinct from private enactments and orders and from
the Mississippi and Texas statutes, place legal imprimatur on completed adop-
tions. 91
The real novelty of the 1851 statute is thus that it, for the first time, inverts
the priority of formal law relative to private action by inverting a portion of the
time sequence: under the 1851 statute and statutes modeled on it, legal pro-
ceedings must come first and the actual adoption comes after. The Massachu-
setts statute created a judicial safety-check of the private arrangement. Yet,
even this temporal shift did not alter the basic directionality of legal ratification
of a fundamentally privately ordered transaction. Further, although there are
novel aspects to the Massachusetts statute, its impact on actual adoption prac-
tice was negligible, as discussed infra at Part V, lessening its import as the ini-
tiator of American adoption.
None of the early statutes altered the basic assumption that law had no role
in defining or structuring the adoption transaction, nor did the statutes create a
role for the state to determine the criteria constituting the "best interests" of the
child. In fact, these statutes may not have been child-welfare centered at all. In
arguing for New York to approve an adoption statute, David Dudley Field fo-
84. CARP, supra note 55, at 11.
85. The specific legislative intent underlying the first adoption statutes remains somewhat conjec-
tural, however, as legislative records were not made or maintained. Presser, supra note 8, at 444 (noting
that "few documentary sources exist which explain the motivations of the adoption lawmakers").
86. CALABRESI, supra note 20, at 83-84.
87. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324.
88. See JEANNE DUPRAU, ADOPTION 22 (1983); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 271-72 (1985); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The
Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851,
73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042-1043 (1979).
89. See Sokoloff, supra note 8, at 18.
90. See id.
91. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324; see discussion, infra Part IL.B, of judicial name change orders in
respect of adoptions completed without court proceedings.
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cused on the need to protect the interests of adoptive parents. 92 In the absence
of a clear legal regime, he argued, biological parents could unscrupulously ex-
tort repeated payments from adoptive parents in return for allowing them to
keep a child to which they had become attached.93 He thus argued for a legal
process to confer on adoptive parents the equivalent of clear title to the child.
B. The Impact of Statutes on Adoption Practice
To end the analysis of adoption law history at the rise of adoption statutes,
with the conclusion that adoption existed prior to their passage, does not speak
to whether private ordering remained central to adoption law and practice after
their passage. This Section examines whether the legal changes during the
1850s replaced the primacy of individual arrangements with legally-centered
adoption arrangements. It concludes that the principal feature of adoption prac-
tice after the first statutes were passed was continuity with pre-statutory prac-
tices-the preponderance of adoptions through the early 1920s continued to
transpire through extra-statutory contractual agreements.
1. The "Child Question" of the Mid-I8OOs and the Orphan Trains
There is no doubt that there was a "child question" in the 1800s. Urbaniza-
tion and immigration brought vast numbers of people into the cities, particu-
larly Manhattan. The "three great waves" of immigration, running from the
early 1800s to 1914, brought over thirty-five million immigrants through New
York City.94 By the mid-1800s, approximately one and a half million immi-
grants lived in poverty in Manhattan tenements; approximately three thousand
children were abandoned and/or homeless.95
The concentration of destitute children in New York and Boston caused
these cities to become the first large-scale focus of child welfare efforts, in-
cluding adoption. New York's first public attempt to deal with poor and va-
grant children was, as with much early American legal activity, modeled on
English law: the city established almshouses similar to those extant under Eng-
96lish Poor Laws. In 1736, the city opened the Infant Hospital on Riker's Island
as an adjunct to its almshouses. Not a model child welfare program, approxi-
mately ninety percent of the children sent to Riker's Island died there in child-
92. FIELD ET AL., supra note 79, at 36.
93. Id.
94. See MICHAEL PATRICK ET AL., WE ARE PART OF HISTORY: THE STORY OF THE ORPHAN TRAINS
20 (1990). See generally, EDITH ABBOTT, IMMIGRATION: SELECT DOCUMENTS AND CASE RECORDS 27-
28 (1969).
95. PATRICK, supra note 94, at 20 (giving population figures); STEPHEN O'CONNOR, ORPHAN
TRAINS: THE STORY OF CHARLES LORING BRACE AND THE CHILDREN HE SAVED AND FAILED xiv (2001)
(presenting child homelessness figures).
96. See generally Hansen, supra note 64, at 1131-33 (discussing the rise in family desertion and
poverty in Nineteenth-Century America).
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Private efforts necessarily supplemented such public efforts, although not in
any large-scale way until significantly later. In 1850, a Boston religious organi-
zation called The Children's Mission began shipping homeless or destitute
children by train to rural areas of the East Coast and Midwest.98 The Mission's
trains provided a model for the better-known "orphan trains"99 of New York's
Children's Aid Society.
The orphan trains began their massive transit of children in 1854, the result
of a private effort spearheaded by Rev. Charles Loring Brace, a graduate of the
Yale Divinity School and founder of the Children's Aid Society (CAS).' Be-
lieving that placing children with families was superior to institutionalization in
orphanages, Brace replicated The Mission's practice of sending children to ru-
ral families. CAS moved a stunning number of children.' 01 From the first train
in March 1854 to the end of 1874, CAS placed approximately twenty thousand
children.1 2 By 1890, CAS had placed eighty-four thousand children-an aver-
age of four thousand children per year from 1874 to 1890.103 The orphan trains
continued until 1927, placing a total of about one hundred and fifty thousand
children with rural families.'
0 4
These thousands of placements shared three salient characteristics for the
purposes of this analysis. First, they were contractual or quasi-contractual. Sec-
ond, they did not transpire under color of statute or as part of a government
program. Third, most of the transfers were informal-no court proceeding at-
tended or legitimated them.
2. Contractual Placements by Charitable Organizations Share Features
of Earlier Contract-Based Adoptions
CAS placed children with families pursuant to contracts that set forth the
97. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94 at 21 (citing Mabel Potter Daggett, The Child Without a Home,
DELINEATOR, Oct., 1907, at 510).
98. PETER HOLLORAN, BOSTON'S WAYWARD CHILDREN: SOCIAL SERVICES FOR HOMELESS
CHILDREN, 1830-1930, 44 (1989) ("Children's Mission orphan trains were used to place children on
farms throughout New England.... [A]gents took bands of thirty to fifty children by train to... com-
munities where local churches made informal indenture ... or adoption arrangements in respectable
families.").
99. The term "orphan train," though widely used to describe this model of placement, is misleading
because many of the children were not orphans. O'Connor estimates that over half of the children
placed had living parents who may or may not voluntarily have surrendered their children. O'CONNOR,
supra note 95, at xix-xx. The Catholic population of New York often criticized the CAS as engaging in
"institutionalized child-snatching." Id. at 168-69.
100. See PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94, at 22, 30.
101. MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OuT IN AMERICA, §§ 2-3 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See generally PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94, at 40-41 (describing one of the last orphan
trains, in 1927).
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terms of the placement, allowed for the return of the child, and divided fees and
costs between the parties.' 0 5 The contractual nature of CAS's child placement
renders it continuous with earlier American and Continental adoption practices
effectuated through personal or notarial contracts; further, the terms of the CAS
contracts echo those of prior American and French contracts.
Contracts were an integral part of the placement of the children. As the or-
phan trains stopped in various towns, the children disembarked and put on
"shows" to attract the attention of prospective adoptive parents.'0 6 These in-
cluded song-and-dance routines and rehearsed pleas such as, "Please will you
be my daddy?" or "Please can I be your little boy/girl?"'10 7 Although these
shows might strike a modem observer as "revolting" or "deplorable," they, like
Internet advertisement, served to create awareness in the communities and in-
terest in adopting the children.
During a show, each child wore a two-sided card around his or her neck.
The card served as the adoption contract between CAS and the adopting party
or parties.
A standard card read:
THE CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF NEW YORK




Terms on which the Children are Placed in Homes
Applicants must be endorsed by the Local Committee ....
Children under 14 years of age if not legally adopted, must be retained as members
of the family, schooled according to the Educational Laws of the State, and com-
fortably clothed until they are 1 81yars old. It is then expected that suitable provi-
sion will be made for their future.
Such contracts constituted the entire legal transaction and formal transfer
of a child to a receiving party for most of the children placed by CAS.
Other organizations contemporary with CAS also extensively placed chil-
dren through contractual agreements. The New York Sisters of Charity of St.
105. See CAS contracts reproduced below.
106. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94, at 33, 35.
107. Id.
108. Reprinted in PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94, at 35.
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Vincent de Paul, for example, established a similar service in 1869 exclusively
for Catholic children. 109 The Sisters' contract denotes the placement of the
child as an "indenture." '" 0 Terming the placement an indenture granted parental
rights without requiring court ratification of an adoption."'
Although the Sisters used the term "indenture," the contract's terms made
clear that the receiving family took the child under fully adoption-like condi-
tions. Terms addressing care and right to property clearly rendered these
placements defacto adoptions: Article II of the contract required that the child
be "treated with care and tenderness as if he were in fact the child of the parties
of the second part"; Article VIII required that, irrespective of subsequently
formal adoption, the child would have full inheritance rights "as if he had been
the natural and legitimate child of the parties of the second part." ' 1 2 Substan-
tively, parental affection and the right to inherit are goods bestowed upon one's
children only, not upon indentured servants. Further, the language "as if he
were in fact the child of the parties" and "as if he had been the natural and le-
gitimate child"'1 3 make sense only in the adoption context.
A final, extra-statutory method of adoptive placement also attests to the
continued existence of adoption as a primarily privately-structured arrange-
ment-the advertisement of children for adoption. Well after the enactment of
statutes requiring court supervision of adoptions, parties engaged in "advertis-
ing" children-a practice that was apparently "widespread." "1 These ads of-
fered both to give away and to transfer the children for a fee paid directly to the
parent(s) or to a facilitator, much like contemporary advertising for adoptions.
C. Assessing the Impact of Statutes on Adoption Regimes and Participants
CAS records show that most children were raised by the families with
which they were placed. Yet, according to the best available estimate, only
twenty percent of those placements received formal approval under the new
adoption statutes."l 5 Given that approximately 150,000 children were adopted
to rural families by CAS, this means that fewer than 30,000 of the adoptions
109. PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94, at 50.
110. Id. at 51.
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. MARGARET KORNITZER, CHILD ADOPTION IN THE MODERN WORLD 347 (1952).
115. The only empirical study of adoption formalization amongst CAS placements was performed
in a somewhat ad hoc fashion by PATRICK ET AL., supra note 94. In the 1980s, Patrick, Sheets, and
Trickel contacted as many CAS "orphan-train" children as they could locate; due to the lack of original
and intervening record-keeping and the death of many of the individuals who would have been children
between 1854 and 1927, only thirty-nine surviving orphan-train children were located. Of these, all
thirty-nine had lived until majority with their family of placement. However, only eight of these fami-
lies, or about twenty percent, had formalized the adoptions in court. Id., supra note 94, at 43. To ex-
trapolate, 120,000 of the 150,000 CAS adoptions-in-fact may not have been formalized under statute;
however, further empirical research is necessary.
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were formalized under statute. For the overwhelming majority of adoptions
during this time period-around 120,000 CAS adoptions alone-the existence
of adoption statutes was irrelevant. The transfer of children from CAS and
other organizations pursuant to contract locates these placements-said to mark
the beginning of American adoption, as discussed supra-squarely within the
history of adoption as a privately-ordered transaction.
Placement contracts used by CAS and other charities strikingly resemble
the French notarial contracts effected between adoption participants. Both early
French and later American contracts note the transfer, specify the minimum
duties owed between the parties, and create a formal record thereof. While
these adoption practices are not culturally or substantively identical, these
similarities create a strong "family resemblance."' 116 During the late 1800s and
early 1900s, vast numbers of children became part of new families through
such contracts. Because these adoptions-in-fact occurred without other legal
formalities, it seems that most adoptions post-dating the first statutes remained
non-statutory. Thus, the chapter of American history generally credited with
marking the birth of adoption through law instead supports the contention that
adoption has continuously existed primarily as a non-statutory private ordering
both before and after the "statutorification" of the 1850s.1 
17
Moving into the present, adoption today remains predominantly privately
ordered and minimally regulated for prospective adoptive parents who meet the
normative model of the standard or "traditional" parents. These norms, and the
regulation of those who diverge from them, constitute the discussion of Part IV.
Of the approximately 130,000 legal, non-relative adoptions in the United States
annually, about eighty-five percent are transacted privately; only about fifteen
percent occur through state agencies or state-regulated agencies. 8
Contemporary private adoptions occur in ways similar to early adoptions in
Europe, colonial America, and the early United States. Adoptive parents may
make a direct arrangement with the birth parent(s). Here, the parties may know
each other, as with adoptions recorded in early France and colonial America,119
or may have located each other through advertisements, as was common in
American adoptions during the turn of the twentieth century.' 20 Alternatively,
116. LUDWIG L. WITTGENSTEIN, THE WITTGENSTEIN READER 49 (Anthony Kenny ed., 1994).
117. CALABRESI, supra note 20 passim. "Statutorification" is Calabresi's term signifying the tran-
sition from a common law regime to a primarily statutory law regime for any given area, and the subse-
quent proliferation of statutes in that area. Id. at 1-2.
118. Melinda Lucas, Comment, Adoption: Distinguishing Between Gray Market and Black Mar-
ket Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553, 555 (2000) (statistics are for 1992). While most state laws permit unli-
censed facilitators to conduct adoptions, or impose modest licensing requirements, agencies are heavily
regulated, and most must function as not-for-profit entities. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family
Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1481 (1992).
119. See discussion supra Part HA-B.
120. See supra Part II.B.2. See Singer, supra note 118, at 1481, for a general discussion of how
prospective adoptive parents locate children privately, particularly noting the role of advertising.
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the parties may employ a facilitator, an agent who typically works in a
profession that offers repeat contact with women who need to place a child-
obstetricians, clergy, and attorneys.' 21 Facilitators typically are agents, such as
obstetricians, clergy, and attorneys, whose professions offer them repeat
contact with women who need to place a child. 122 Or, a facilitator may conduct
a business that obtains clients through advertising in various media. These
private adoptions are significantly faster and more flexible than public agency
adoptions. 23 Predictably, the Internet increasingly serves both as a medium for
information about available homes and available children and as a vehicle
through which matches occur between them. 24 Across the states, private
placements through direct contacts and unregulated or lightly-regulated
facilitators constitute the norm. Forty-three of the fifty states permit parents to
place their children with unrelated prospective parents through direct or inter-
mediated private arrangements. 125 The formalization of these arrangements
varies across states but generally requires that the parties undergo a brief "home
study" by a social worker. 126 The parties then appear before a judge, who grants
or denies the adoption petition.127
IV. LEGAL VERSUS PRIVATE ORDERING IN CONTEMPORARY ADOPTION:
How JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY REGIMES POLICE THE
BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY NORMS
A. Why the Mishistory Matters: What Is at Stake in the Contemporary
Understanding ofAdoption Law as a Creature of Statute
If privately arranged, minimally-regulated adoptions dominate the current
adoption reality, why is it significant if courts, legal scholars, or other legal
actors assert that adoption's history is purely statutory? Why does the a
121. Id. at 1480.
122. Lucas, supra note 118, at 555.
123. For a detailed treatment of private, agency, and state agency practices and regulation across
the states, see generally JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (2000) 1-68.
Hollinger reports that prospective adoptive parents who pursue an independent adoption typically wait
under a year for a child whereas an agency adoption may take as long as eight years. Id.
124. E.g., Kelly Costigan, Going It Alone, TOWN & COUNTRY, June 1993, at 61 (noting the begin-
ning of Internet use for locating or placing children for adoption); Friel, supra note 4; Maggie Johnson,
Aspiring Adoptive Parents Face Greed, Competition, Exploitation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at Al
(reporting that the Internet gives new market power to birth mothers, who can select prospective parents
through specialized websites); Lyall, supra note 4, at A3 (involving twins who were adopted via a Cali-
fomia broker found on the Internet); Roughton, supra note 4 (discussing an adoption planned via e-mail
through an Internet broker).
125. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in HOLLINGER ET AL.,
supra note 123, at 1-69-1-70.
126. The home study assesses that the child seems well-cared for and that there are no particular-
ized bases for doubting the prospective parents' ability to provide an adequate home, such as evidence
of substance abuse or domestic violence. Id.
127. Id.
Vol. 20:263, 2002
Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children
"counterhistory" of adoption amount to more than a historical curiosity? The
answer is that the (mis)conceptualization of adoption as primarily statutory
does important work in contemporary law: it supports the continued exclusion
of broad categories of people from adopting children.'28
Adoption statutes specyifing who may adopt, and judicial constructions
thereof, have encoded and largely continue to encode major normative biases of
what a standard family looks like. These statutory regimes do their norm-
policing work in every adoption, regardless of whether the arrangement arose
privately or through an agency. Agencies implement statutory exclusions
directly. In privately-arranged adoptions, courts implement the statutes' norm-
policing content through granting or denying the adoption petition based upon
construction of the statute. 129
Thus, judges are gatekeepers. Their views of the history and legitimate
scope of adoption law affect their choice of interpretive approach and ultimate
result. The history of adoption as a creature of statute influences judges in two
ways. First, it imposes the "in derogation of the common law" requirement of
strict construction, which affects the actual exercise of interpretation. Second,
the idea of adoption as a creation of law lends appropriateness to the legislative
endeavor of defining what constitutes an appropriate adoptive family-
conceptually, the history of adoption law as a legislative invention may
influence judges to accept overt legal imposition of traditional norms as
appropriate legislative exercises where they otherwise might subject such
exercises to more skeptical scrutiny.
B. Discriminatory Content in Contemporary Adoption Statutes
Explicit and implicit discrimination in adoption statutes abounds. Adoption
statutes in almost every state have discriminated on the basis of religion,
prohibiting inter-religious adoptions;1 30 a significant minority of state statutes
continue to incorporate some preference for religious matching.!31 Statutes and
judicial interpretations thereof have institutionalized race bias by prohibiting
adoptions across racial lines; further, adoption workers governed by such
statutes "assigned" a race to children of ambiguous appearance or multi-ethnic
128. See discussion infra Part IV.C, notes 139-167 and accompanying text.
129. Hollinger, supra note 125, at 1-71-1-72.
130. These statues require religious matching between prospective parents and child; this
reinforces the norm of the family as a religious institution, discriminates between individuals, and
blocks child placements. In 1954, forty-three states had religious matching statutes. Twila L. Perry, The
Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993-1994) (citing Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship, and
Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 376, 376 n.5 (1954)).
13 1. By 1989, seventeen states continued to require religious matching in at least some adoptive
placements, and nine used language recommending matching "whenever practicable." Gregory A.
Horowitz, Accommodation and Neutrality Under the Establishment Clause: The Foster Care Chal-
lenge, 98 YALE L.J. 617, 624 n.46 (1989).
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* 132parentage, determining not only the adoptive home but the child's identity.
Courts have also interpreted adoption statutes to support discrimination against
potential adoptive parents on the basis of age.'
33
Most contentious in recent years, many statutes either explicitly
discriminate against gay/lesbian prospective parents or silently discriminate
through omitting gay family structures. Section 63.042 of the Florida Statute,
for example, provides: "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual."' 13 4 In 1998, the House adopted an
amendment that bans unmarried couples from adopting children in the District
of Columbia.' 35 The record expresses that the amendment's purpose is to bar
same-sex couples from adopting. As Representative Riggs stated, the amend-
132. Some states continue to require by law a preference for same-race adoptions. E.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1997), which provides in pertinent part, "the authorized child-
placing agency shall give preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to placing the child
with ... a family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child .... "
Race preference statutes led to significant delays or non-placement of children that otherwise would
have been adopted. A Pennsylvania case from 1990 illustrates: the state agency refused adoptive place-
ment to a black child in its care first because individuals seeking to adopt him were single and then be-
cause several married couples seeking to adopt him were not of his race. After six years, the agency re-
moved him from the "adoptable" list because, after years of temporary foster placements, he was unable
to bond with adults. William Raspberry, Why Won't Adoption Agencies Place Black Children,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 22, 1990, at AI5. Courts, in part in reliance on the strict construction of
adoption statutes, have upheld the statutes' racial distinctions.
To avoid these harms, some recent adoption reform statutes prohibit delaying adoptions on the basis
of race. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01(A) (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.045
(West 1997) (providing that adoption shall not be delayed or denied on the basis of race). California
only repealed its statute's incorporation of racial matching preferences in 1995. CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 8708, 8710 (West 1994).
The perpetuation of such statutory provisions has been buttressed by courts' use of the history of
adoption as statutory. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding removal of black child from white foster parents and denial of
foster parents' adoption application on the basis of race). For in-depth, thoughtful considerations of
interracial adoption, see generally R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents'
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998), and Elizabeth
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching and Adoption, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1163 (1991). It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the complex history of racial pref-
erences in adoption or assess the merits of racial preference, which numerous scholars both assert and
challenge.
133. E.g., Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 28,
1992) (finding against adoption because "age... was similar to that of a biological grandparent"); She-
how v. Plier (In re Tachick), 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973) (barring adoption due to "larger age
difference than the normal age difference... between the natural parents and their children").
134. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 77-140 (1977). Florida is not alone in this policy. E.g., An Act Prohibiting
Homosexuals From Adopting or Being Foster Parents, Ch. 343, § 343:1, 1987 N.H. Laws 379, 379-380
(stating legislative findings supporting statute prohibiting gay people from adopting and becoming fos-
ter parents); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 26 (N.H. 1987) (holding, in response to ques-
tion by the New Hampshire legislature, that a bill prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting would
not violate substantive rights under state or federal constitutions). By contrast, Vermont has passed a
statute expressly permitting unmarried couples to adopt. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (1997)
("If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the
child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child of the parent").
135. 144 CONG. REc. H7399 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1998). The amendment in question was proposed
by Rep. Largent, for Rep. Largent's explanation of the amendment, see 144 CONG. REC. H7382 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1998).
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ment aims to counter "those who would seek to legitimize same-sex activity"
and to block "the claim by homosexuals that they should be able to adopt."'
' 36
New Hampshire similarly banned gay adoption in the name of children's best
interests, without permitting particularized findings of fact as to whether a
given placement would or would not serve the child's needs in light of other
available alternatives.1
37
In blocking gay adoptions, these statutes are a reaction to the view that so-
cial acceptance of same-sex orientation could be promoted through allowing
gays to adopt. 138 This concern with not "promoting" homosexuality trumps
particularized concern for individual children or prospective parents, using the
adoptive family as the site for drawing boundaries about permissible family
forms. Rigg's statement opposing gay adoption on the basis that it could "le-
gitimize same-sex activity" makes clear the social norm-policing function of
adoption statutes over their putative best interests purposes.'39
C. Judicial Interpretation in Reliance on the Statutory Mishistory and the
Need for a "Counterhistory"
The Florida and amended District of Columbia statutes are exceptional in
their naming of gays as a prohibited class. Where a statute is explicit, a court is
arguably bound by it to deny adoption petitions by the excluded class. How-
ever, statutes usually imply the exclusion of gays by excluding unmarried cou-
ples and/or the unmarried partner of a biological parent from adopting. With
these statutes, judicial interpretation of the statute is the key to whether the
class at issue can adopt. It is in these cases that the court's understanding of
adoption as a statutory creation instead of as an institution drawing on multiple
sources of legal and social authority, influences judicial interpretation of the
statutes at issue.
In the major cases in which courts had to determine if the state's adoption
statute permitted the adoptive arrangement that the parties sought, judges ex-
plicitly relied on the dominant history of adoption law to guide their interpreta-
tion of the statute. In In re MMD. & B.H.M, 140 a District of Columbia pre-
anti-gay amendment adoption case, the court made clear the severe limits on
interpretation imposed by strict construction, and how those limits relate to the
understanding of adoption as a creature of statute. The court stated that,
136. Id. at H7343 (statement of Rep. Riggs).
137. An Act Prohibiting Homosexuals From Adopting or Being Foster Parents, Ch. 343, § 343:1,
1987 N.H. Laws 379, 379-380.
138. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (describing the shift from overt
anti-gay rhetoric to the argument that gay activity should not be promoted through its recognition in
various legal contexts and structures, including the family).
139. 144 CONG. REC. H7343 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1998).
140. 662 A.2d 837, 849 (D.C. 1995).
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"[a]ccording to strict construction doctrine," courts have "'consistently held
legislation derogative of the common law accountable to an exactness of ex-
pression and have not allowed the effects of such legislation to be extended be-
yond the necessary and unavoidable meaning of its terms.",
4 1
In both In re Adoption of Tammy 142 and MMD., 14 divided courts engaged
in feats of reasoning in order to route around the strict construction requirement
and find in favor of the petitioners. In a third case, In the Interest ofAngel Lace
M, the court's strict construction a statute identical to that in Tammy caused
the court to find against the petitioners-even though the court simultaneously
found that the adoption would have been in the best interests of the child.1
44
These cases demonstrate the need for a "counterhistory" of adoption to provide
judges with a different understanding of the role of law in defining the adoptive
family and to furnish them with different interpretive tools. 
145
1. Adoption of Tammy and M.M.D.
In Adoption of Tammy, in which a Harvard professor and her partner sought
146jointly to adopt the biological daughter of one of the women, and In re
MMD.,147 concerning the adoption of a girl by male domestic partners, courts
decided whether the adoption statutes in question could permit these family ar-
rangements. In both of these cases, the courts resorted to the history of adoption
law to guide their interpretive process. The Tammy court noted, "[t]he law of
adoption is purely statutory, and the governing statute... is to be strictly fol-
lowed in all its essential particulars." 48 Similarly, the MMD. court noted that
"[b]efore 1895, when Congress enacted its first adoption statute, adoptions
were unavailable in the District of Columbia because adoption was not possible
at common law."' 149 For this reason, the MMD. court also asserted that it was
required to construe the statute in question strictly.
1 50
After asserting that they must strictly construe the adoption statutes because
of their history, both courts performed jurisprudential acrobatics so that "strict
141. Id. at 844 (quoting Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1942)) (emphasis
added).
142. 619 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (Mass. 1993).
143. 662 A.2d 837.
144. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
145. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1505-11. Eskridge argues that, as history constructs basic assump-
tions about current social conditions, a critical reexamination of history-or a recovery of aspects of a
history that have become invisible or erased---can be essential to recalibrating social and legal norms.
Id. at 1511. Producing the "counterhistory" can be instrumental in altering "mainstream culture and
law." Id.
146. 619 N.E.2d at 317-18.
147. 662 A.2d at 849.
148. 619 N.E.2d at 317-18 (internal citations omitted).
149. 662 A.2d at 849.
150. Id. at 854.
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construction" of the statutes permitted the parties to adopt.1 51 The difficulty this
task posed is evidenced by the length of the MMD. opinion: MMD. engages
in over twenty pages of close linguistic interpretation in order to arrive at a
"strict" reading that permits adoption by same-sex unmarried partners. With
a different history to recite, courts could ratify such family forms more easily
and directly.
Tammy and MMD. reached permissive outcomes through ostensibly strict
construction. However, strict construction continues to defeat non-standard
adoptions more often than it admits them. 53 Strict construction became the
point of law that split the Tammy court: in the Court's 4-3 opinion in favor of
the adoption, the three dissenting judges argued that the court lacked the power
to liberally interpret the statute to permit the adoption irrespective of whether
the adoption served Tammy's best interests. As Judge Lynch wrote in the
Tammy dissent, "[s]ince adoption is a creature of the Legislature, and in dero-
gation of the common law, the statute must be strictly construed. ' 1 4 Although
Lynch stated that he believed Susan and Helen, birth mother and nonbiological
mother respectively, to be excellent parents and the adoption in Tammy's best
interests, he asserted that he could not reach that result under the language of
the statute.1 55 "[T]he court's decision," he wrote, "which is inconsistent with
the statutory language, cannot bejustified by a desire to achieve what is in the
child's best interests."' 156 Rather, because the statute in question did not ex-
pressly or implicitly contemplate the adoption of a child by two unmarried par-
ties, the court was precluded from interpreting the statute to achieve that re-
sult. 57
2. In the Interest of Angel Lace M.
In a case following Tammy, a Wisconsin court denied an adoption petition
identical to the Tammy petition-proposed adoption by a mother and her same-
sex partner of their daughter--on the basis of strict construction. 158 After the
151. Id. at 846-49; Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
152. 662 A.2d at 846-49
153. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999) (concluding that legislature
meant to preclude second parent adoptions); In re Adoption of Doe, 1998 WL 904252 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998) (finding that statute requires termination of parental right and cannot be construed to permit sec-
ond-parent adoption); In The Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (holding strict
construction of statute derogative of common law controls over best interests of child standard in de-
nying adoption petition of biological mother's same-sex partner); Matter of Adams, 473 N.W. 712
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that statute does not expressly provide for joint adoption by two unmar-
ried petitioners).
154. 619 N.E.2d at 322-23 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. McGraw, 92 N.E. 332 (Mass.
1910)).
155. Id. at 321-22.
156. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. 516 N.W.2d 678.
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lower court denied the parties' adoption petition, Angel's mother and her part-
ner appealed. 159 No party sought to defend against the appeal. 60 The biological
father, the nominal party in interest opposing the adoption, 61 did not oppose
the adoption. 162 The state's attorney general, who ordinarily would have de-
fended an appeal against the state, "declined to participate ... to defend the or-
der of the circuit court and the constitutionality of the adoption statutes."' 163 In
effect, no party, in interest or otherwise, opposed this adoption. In order that the
opposing side could be argued, the Wisconsin court resorted to appointing pri-
vate counsel. 164 Thus, Angel Lace M presents the spectacle of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court effectively appointing private counsel to itself to justify its de-
cision to deny an adoption sought by all parties. Under a private ordering para-
digm, this adoption would have occurred. Under a legal ordering paradigm, in
part buttressed by the erasure of adoption's nonstatutory legal history, a legally
constructed definition of adoptive parent controlled-to the harm and over the
objection of all parties, including the state's own attorney general.
The Angel Lace M court agreed with state social workers and expert wit-
nesses that Angel's adoption would serve her best interests. 165 However, it
found that it did not have the power to interpret the statute to permit the adop-
tion. 166 Here, the court turned to the statutory nature of adoption law, reciting
the now-familiar cant that adoption did not exist at common law. "Adoption
proceedings," the court stated, "unknown at common law, are of statutory ori-
gin and the essential statutory requirements must be substantially met to vali-
,,167date the proceedings. The court reiterated later that "since [adoption] was
unknown to the common law, [it] is purely statutory and the statutes must be
strictly followed."' 168 Interpretive canons and language in the statute itself urg-
ing that the best interests standard govern did not sway the court to depart from
its asserted requirement of strict construction.
169
159. Id. at 680.
160. Id.
161. The father served as the nominal party in interest against the adoption because it would ter-
minate his parental rights.
162. Id. at 680, 689.
163. Id. at 681 n.2.
164. Id. at 689. Even the appointed counsel (nominally representing the father) acknowledged that
"the adoption would be in Angel's best interests." Id.
165. Id.at681.
166. Id. Here, the court acknowledges the normative functions of adoption statutes, noting their
particular role in defining family participants on criteria separate from the best interests of the child.
The court stated that "[w]ere we to allow a court to grant an adoption petition any time the adoption is
in the best interests of the child, there would be no need for the plethora of adoption statutes." Id..
167. Id. (quoting Estate of Topel, 145 N.W.2d 162 (Wis. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted
and emphasis added).
168. Id. at 688 (quoting legislative council notes, Legislative Council Reports, vol. VI, part 1, bill
no. 444, at 10 (1955).
169. Id. at 687 (stating that "[a]lthough the dissents accurately point out that sec. 48.01(2), Stats.,
directs us to liberally construe ch. 48 with '[t]he best interests of the child' in mind, we are still bound
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CONCLUSION
Although there is plurality amongst courts-and amongst judges on the
same court-as to whether adoption statutes must be strictly construed in def-
erence to legislatures or liberally construed in deference to the best interests
principle, the erroneous understanding of adoption as purely statutory clearly
continues to create problems and impose costs. These costs include the direct
hardship to families that cannot accomplish otherwise beneficial adoptions, the
efficiency loss of judges' repeated extensive reconsideration of the strict con-
struction issue (as evidenced by the thirty-plus page analysis in MMD. ),170 and
the cost to the integrity of judicial decision-making where judges use strict con-
struction as a subterfuge.
As Karl Lewellyn noted, there are "two opposing canons [of statutory inter-
pretation] on almost every point"; a judge's choice of canon more often justi-
fies a result than dictates it. 171 From their dissent in Tammy, it seems Judges
Lynch and O'Connor found themselves bound by strict construction to find
against the parties. 172 While the Tammy dissenters may have been unwillingly
constrained, other decision-makers could employ strict construction as juris-
prudential cover for underlying opposition to an adoption. If the understanding
of adoption law as purely statutory were not entrenched, judges who oppose
such arrangements ideologically would not be able to claim that their conclu-
sions were determined by strict construction. Rather, the absence of such shel-
ter might force them to state the substantive grounds for their objections to the
adoption. Where a judge openly speaks in the "contested idiom of morality"-
"outing" the moral subtext of a decision, so to speak-it can force an open re-
consideration of the subject and, in certain instances, inspire legislative action
that favors the group in question. 73 Thus, eliminating the strict construction
fallacy as either a constraint on well-intentioned decision- makers or a refuge
for reactionary ones would lead to better, more efficient, and perhaps more
honest outcomes in nontraditional adoption cases.
Adoption in the United States both historically has been and currently
should be a private ordering ratified by law. In challenging the "law first" stan-
dard history of adoption, this Note attempts to provide a historical and norma-
by the statutory requirements for adoption").
170. Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
171. Karl N. Lewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
172. Judge Nolan, the third dissenter, wrote separately to express his disapproval of Helen and Su-
san's fitness to mother Tammy based on their sexual orientation and the nontraditional nature of their
family. On all other points, he joined Lynch's dissent. 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (Nolan, J.,
dissenting).
173. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in the Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 364 (1996) (recounting that the "outrageous" conduct of a judge who lightly
sentenced and openly sympathized with the killer of a homosexual man led to the state's enactment of a
penalty-enhancing hate crimes statute).
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tive basis for the position that families themselves should determine their mem-
bership and methods of formation. Reclaiming the pre- and non-statutory legal
history of adoption is important because it legitimates participant-driven and -
defined adoptions. If adoption law is understood as having created adoption,
defined what it is-and may or may not be-then definitional power resides in
legal institutions. A different history thus serves as an important tool for creat-
ing a new future. Recognizing that adoption practice and law have permitted
diverse families to form according to the needs of their participants suggests
that law should play a more limited role in defining the content of adoptive
homes. The role of law should instead be that of evaluator and ratifier of the
arrangements individuals come together to create. More immediately, the
"counterhistory" of adoption may free certain decision-makers to expand their
interpretation restrictive or silent statutes to permit these family forms. Or, in
stripping away the shield of strict construction as a justification for denial of a
nontraditional adoption petition, this different history may force decision-
makers to express their prejudices in an open, contentious idiom of discrimina-
tion-which may also help bring about reform. Adoption and adoption policy
"implicate[] our most deeply held beliefs and values about family, community,
and identity.'74 These values are too important to be constructed by prejudice
and mistake.
174. Banks, supra note 132, at 878.
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